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TORTS/WRONGFUL DEATH--Should a Wrongful Death Action Expire Before the Decedent Does? A Wrong Turn for
Wrongful Death. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879 (Wyo.
1998).
INTRODUCTION

Approximately two years and one month after discovering that William

A. Fogarty M.D. misdiagnosed a cancerous condition in his neck, Larry
Edwards died due to metastasized cancer.' Though Edwards never filed a
medical malpractice claim against Fogarty, his wife, as personal representative, brought a wrongful death suit against the doctor.2 Because the statute
of limitation on Edwards's underlying claim for medical malpractice expired before he died, the district court held that a wrongful death claim by
his personal representative also was time barred.' In a three to two decision,
the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a "viable"
underlying
4
claim is a condition precedent to recovery for wrongful death.
The chain of events that ultimately led to the Wyoming Supreme
Court's decision in Edwards began in August 1989, when Larry Edwards
visited his family physician, Bruce Hayse, M.D., after Edwards's wife discovered a lump on his neck.' Hayse referred Mr. Edwards to Norman
Roland, M.D., who removed the tissue from one of the salivary glands near
his right ear.6 After the surgery, Roland submitted the tissue to pathologist
William A. Fogarty, M.D., who diagnosed the tissue as benign.7
In February 1991, Mr. Edwards noticed more swelling on the right side
of his neck, prompting him to visit Hayse again. After examining Mr. Edwards, Hayse ordered a CT scan, which revealed that abnormalities in the
right parotid gland were suspicious of cancer.' As a result, Hayse referred
Mr. Edwards to the University of Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake City,
where a biopsy revealed a malignant tumor.9 On March 15, 1991, Dr. R.
Kim Davis performed several surgical procedures on Mr. Edwards, includ-

I. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 880 (Wyo. 1998).
2. Id. at 880-81.
3. Id. at 881.
4. Id. at 882-83.

5. Brief of Appellees William A. Fogarty, M.D., an Individual, and William A. Fogarty, M.D.,
P.C., a Professional Corporation at 4, Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1998) (No. 97-40)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellees].
6. Brief of Appellants at 3, Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1998) (No. 97-40) [hereinafter
Brief of Appellants]. The salivary gland from which tissue was removed was the right parotid gland. Id.
7. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 880. The precise diagnosis was a benign condition known as a pleomorphic adenoma, or a mixed cystic tumor. Brief of Appellants, supra note 6,at3.
8. Brief of Appellants, supra note 6,at3. The precise diagnosis was that Mr. Edwards had abnormalities suspicious of 'neoplastic process" (cancer). Id.
9. Id.
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ing the removal of his entire right parotid gland.'" For a period of time afterward, Mr. Edwards underwent radiation treatments that were ultimately
unsuccessful." Larry Edwards died due to metastasized cancer on April 5,
1993.12

After performing Mr. Edwards's surgeries on March 15, 1991, Davis
procured the pathology slides prepared and interpreted by Fogarty in 1989
and turned them over to Dr. Rueben S. Doggett, a pathologist., Doggett
examined the tissue and determined that although no "unequivocally malignant cells [were] present within the gland" the tissue was "suspicious for
malignancy" and strongly suggested "mucoepidermoid carcinoma."'" As a
result of all of this, Mr. Edwards became aware, possibly as early as February 21, 1991, and certainly no later than March 1991, that Fogarty may have
misdiagnosed the first tissue sample.'5 Regardless, he never filed a medical
malpractice claim against Fogarty. "6
On April 4, 1995, Edwards's widow, as personal representative, filed a
wrongful death action alleging that Fogarty negligently failed to properly
diagnosis the cancer in 1989 and that the negligence caused her husband's
death.' Fogarty filed an Answer on April 26, 1995 and filed motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment on September 5, 1996.81 The motions
asserted that because Mr. Edwards failed to file a medical malpractice action against Fogarty within the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims," Ms. Edwards's wrongful death action was time barred.,, The dis-

10. Id. In addition to the right total paroidectomy, Davis performed a radical neck dissection and
facial nerve caval grafting on Mr. Edwards. Id.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 880. "Metastasis" is the process by which malignant cells "spread away
from the periphery of the tumor locally through the regional lymphatic network" and to other parts of the
body. ROBERT K. AUSMAN, M.D. AND DEAN E. SNYDER, J.D., MEDICAL LIBRARY, LAWYERS EDITION
§ 25:9, at 540 (1992).
13. Brief of Appellants, supranote 6, at 4.
14. Id.

15. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 881.
16, Id. at 880.
17. Id. at 880-81. The complaint named William A. Fogarty, M.D., William A. Fogarty M.D., PC.,

and St. John's Hospital as defendants, alleging vicarious liability on the part of the hospital. Id. at 881.
Because the claim against St. John's Hospital was one of vicarious liability and because the arguments
against the hospital were the same as those against Fogarty, the defendants are collectively referred to as
"Fogarty" for the remainder of this note.
18. Id.
19. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-107(a) (Michie 1997) provided in pertinent part:

A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed
or certified professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater

of the following times:
(i) Within (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a
cause of action may be instituted not more than two years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, error
or omission was:
Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or
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trict court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that because Mr. Edwards
had no "viable action" at the time of his death, any wrongful death action by
his survivors was also time barred.2' Ms. Edwards appealed the decision to
the Wyoming Supreme Court, which cited the plain language of Wyoming's
wrongful death statute and the "clear majority rule" in other jurisdictions to
2
affirm in a three to two decision.
This note will argue that the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision represents an undesirable interpretation of both the wrongful death cause of
action generally and Wyoming's wrongful death statute in particular. The
note will first critique the analysis of statutory language employed by the
majority in Edwards in reading a condition precedent into the wrongful
death cause of action. Second, it will analyze the Wyoming Supreme
Court's ruling that wrongful death suits are subject to the same defenses that
exist against an underlying claim. Third, this note will describe how the
majority's analysis of the purposes behind statutes of limitation neglects
critical considerations that weigh against applying a condition precedent to
the wrongful death cause of action. Finally, this note will conclude that the
better rule is that the statute does not include a condition precedent that requires the decedent to have a viable underlying claim at the time of death.
BACKGROUND

The Origin of Wrongful Death Actions in England
Discussion of wrongful death actions often begins with Lord Ellenborough's opinion in the 1808 case, Baker v. Bolton." However, the notion of
a wrongful death cause of action can actually be traced back to the early
days of Anglo-Saxon law. 4 There, a person who killed another faced judicial proceedings that took on a civil nature and sometimes led to payment of
damages to the survivors of the deceased.,, By forcing the killer to pay
The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2)
year period despite the exercise of due diligence.
20. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 881. Ms. Edwards did not respond to the motion until 77 days after it was
filed. Id. As a result, the district court granted the motion to strike her response. Id. In addition, Ms.
Edwards did not contest the granting of the motion to strike her response. Id. As a result, evidence
presented in the affidavit and exhibits attached to Fogarty's motion for summary judgment was undisputed, although the Wyoming Supreme Court noted in its decision in Edwards that the facts in the briefs
of the parties and in Edwards's complaint vary only slightly. Id.
21. Id. In announcing the appropriate standard of review in Edwards, the court noted that because
"the district court was presented matters outside the pleadings, appellees' motion is construed to be a
W.R.A.P. 56 motion for summary judgment ... even though the district court fashioned its order as one
granting a motion to dismiss." Id. (citing Burlington Norther R. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 918 P.2d 987,
990-91 (Wyo. 1996)).
22. Id. at 882-83.
23. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
24. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043, 1055 (1965) (citing 2
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 43-46 (3d ed. 1923) and I FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 46-47 (2d ed. 1899)).

25. Id.
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those damages, which were calculated according to fixed schedules that
took into account the status of the deceased, the courts tried to discourage
feuding and encourage peace." As time went on and as attitudes changed,
homicide came to be viewed less as a civil wrong and more as an offense
against the state. 7 By the late thirteenth century, homicide became classified as a criminal offense for which the property of the killer was turned
over to the state. 2' Even involuntary or accidental homicides, though not
classified as felonies, resulted in forfeitures? 9 Because killers forfeited their
property to the state, survivors no longer had a means to recover damages."
Over the course of the next few hundred years the English courts discussed the cause of action for wrongful death sparingly, paying little attention to the subject until Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Baker v. Bolton.,'
In Baker, the plaintiffs wife died nearly a month after suffering injuries in a
stagecoach accident. The plaintiff, who brought suit for loss of consortium
and services, was allowed to recover only for the loss that accrued after the
accident but before death."2 As for the loss the plaintiff suffered as the result
of his wife's death, Lord Ellenborough observed, "[i]n a civil court, the
death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury; and in this
case the damages as to the plaintiffs wife must stop with the period of her
existence."' 3 Though accounts of how and why Lord Ellenborough reached
his now-famous conclusions vary,14 at least one commentator notes that the
rule that a person's death is not a legal injury was based on neither precedent nor logic.,,
Regardless, and despite dissent, the decision was widely followed in
England until passage of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846.6 The Act, which
created a cause of action for specific relatives of the deceased, was passed

26. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY § 1:2, at 1-9 & n.3

(3d ed. 1992).
27. Id. at 1-9 to 1-10 (citing Gustavus Hay, Jr., Death as a Civil Cause ofAction in Massachusetts,7
HARVARD L. REv. 170 (1893)).

28. Id. at 1-10.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1-11 to 1-12 (citing T.A. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Basesof the Common Law Rules, 13
VAND. L. REv. 612 (1960)).

Speiser suggests that the "merger doctrine," which dictates that a civil

action is merged into a felony, originated here. Id. at 1-10. Regardless, though the doctrine was modified such that a civil action against a killer was simply suspended rather than merged, civil actions generally could not be enforced. Id. at I-I 1 to 1-12. This was due to the fact that the punishment for felony
murder was the forfeiture of property and execution, leaving survivors without property to recover or a

tortfeasor to sue. Id.
31. See generally Malone, supra note 24, at 1056-58, for an excellent discussion of cases in England
prior to Baker.

32. See id. at 1058 (citing Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808)).
33. Id. at 1058 (quoting Baker, I Camp. 493).
34. See generally SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, at 1-12 to 1-14, for the various interpretations of
what may have led to Ellenborough's decision.
35. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, at 1-14.
36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 & n.6 (5th

ed. 1984).
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in large part due to both the rapid rise of industrialization 7 and the "inherent
injustice" in the old rule? Under the rule in Baker, "the most grievous of
all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a remedy."3' Under Lord Campbell's Act, a new cause of
action for wrongful death was created for the parents, spouse, children,
grandparents, and grandchildren of the deceased.- Specifically, the Act
provided that an action could be maintained for "any wrongful act, neglect
or default, of another, such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled
the party injured" to bring suit." It further provided that the wrongful death
action by survivors must be brought within twelve months of the death of
the decedent., The decision in Baker and the subsequent passage of Lord
Campbell's Act eventually had the greatest influence on American courts
and legislatures.41
The Development of Wrongful Death Actions in the United States Common
Law
Before the decision in Baker, American courts dating back as far as
colonial Massachusetts recognized the right of recovery for survivors when
a loved one died." In addition to numerous cases in the Massachusetts
courts, decisions by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in 1794 and the Supreme Court of New York in 1838 allowed surviving relatives to recover
compensation for wrongful death.,'
Despite the fact that many American courts consistently ignored the
Baker decision for nearly 40 years, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the
case of Carey v. Berkshire" eventually embraced the decision and the rule
that no common law cause of action should exist for wrongful death. 7 Almost every state in the Union followed suit, relying on the Baker and Carey

37. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 17.11, at 454 (1999).
38. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:8 at 1-34.
39. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 945.

40. Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict C. 93 (1846) (commonly referred to as Lord Campbell's Act).
41. Id.

42. Id.

43. SPEISERETAL., supra note 26, § 1:3 at 1-14, § 1:8 at 1-35.
44. Malone, supra note 24, at 1062-63. This right to compensation for the wrongful death of a loved
one was in large part the result of a society that relied on a system of "natural justice" rather than English
common law. Id. (citing FRANCIS ROBERT AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3-18
(1940); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 3 (1911); Paul Samuel Reinsch, The
English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in I SELECT ESSAYS INANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 367, 380 (John Henry Wigmore ct al. eds., 1907)).
45. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:3 at 1-14 to 1-16 (citing Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn.
1794) and Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838)).
46. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 108 (1851).
47. Malone, supra note 24, at 1067 (citing Carey, 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 108).
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decisions to extinguish any common law causes of action that existed for
wrongful death."
Although wrongful death statutes serve as the basis for most wrongful
death actions today, several American courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, eventually came to again recognize common law actions for
wrongful death." In Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc.,1' the U.S. Supreme Court rendered what might be the most significant wrongful death
opinion in the history of our country." There the Court held that an action
in wrongful death existed under general maritime law.,2 The case is important not so much for the limited rule that it established, but more so for its
resounding criticism of the Baker case."3 The Court noted that historians
have concluded that the justification for the common law rule expressed in
Baker was nothing more than the felony-merger doctrine' 4-a doctrine that
failed to survive the nineteenth century and never existed in the United
States." However, the Court noted Lord Ellenborough made no mention of
the doctrine in his opinion in Baker, nor did he support his opinion with
reasoning or cite other authorities that established a similar rule." Though
the Court said adoption of the English rule in the United States likely was a
product of "the blessing of age," it stated, in no uncertain terms, that a "satisfactory justification for applying the rule in this country" never existed."
Citing Lord Campbell's Act as the first evidence of legislative reaction to
the rule, the Court detailed how legislatures in both the United States and
England "began to evidence unanimous disapproval of the rule against recovery for wrongful death.""s It went on to note that the numerous federal
and state wrongful death statutes that were adopted after Baker illustrate
that public policy in the United States favors the recognition of the wrongful
death action."'

48. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:3 at 1-16. According to Speiser, Hawaii is the only state that
never overruled an early rejection of Baker. Id. (citing Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 209 (1860)). It is important to note that most of the decisions holding that no common law cause of action existed for wrongful death came after the promulgation of state wrongful death statutes. Malone, supra note 24, at 1073.
They are viewed mostly as examples ofjudicial reluctance to recognize a common-law right that would

compete with the statutes. Id.
49. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:7 at 1-25 to 1-34.

50. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In Moragne, the Court unanimously held that a common law action under
general maritime law existed for wrongful death that resulted from a violation of maritime duties. Id. at
409.
51. SPEISER ET AL., supranote 26, § 1:7 at 1-25.
52. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
53. SPEISER ET AL., supranote 26, § 1:7 at 1-25.
54. See supranote 30.
55. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 382-84 (citing F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 55 at 52-57 (Landon ed. 1951)
and Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. REv. 431 (1916)).

56. Id. at 383 (citing Baker, I Camp. 493).
57. Id. at 385.
58. Id.at 389.

59. Id. at 390.
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The Development of Wrongful Death Statutes in the United States
Federal statutes now provide a cause of action for wrongful death in
several specific situations, and every state now has a wrongful death
statute." The majority of states have enacted pure wrongful death statutes
and modeled them after Lord Campbell's Act, creating an entirely new
cause of action for survivors." Pure wrongful death statutes are defined as
statutes that compensate survivors for the loss of the support, services, and
contributions they would have received had death not ensued. 2 For that
reason, pure wrongful death statutes are best understood as operating under
a "loss to survivor" regime.
A minority of states, on the other hand, simply expanded survival statutes for the benefit of designated survivors. These "enlarged survivaldeath" statutes are simply survival statutes that transfer the action a decedent had before his death to a designated beneficiary and add an element of
damages for wrongful death.6' The result is often a "loss to estate" regime,
where damages are calculated without respect to the economic loss to survivors but, instead, by calculating some variation of the decedent's lost income minus living expenses and contributions had he lived." These "loss to
estate" statutes "may or may not reflect actual losses and may or may not
actually benefit dependents.""
Although many wrongful death statutes are modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, the provisions of the individual acts often vary, as do the constructions courts attach to these statutes." Most states' wrongful death statutes include their own limitation periods, while some rely on the statutes of
limitation for personal injury claims. 7 The limitation periods also vary from
statute to statute, as does treatment of the question of when causes of action
accrue."

60. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 945. The author's list of federal statutes includes, "FELA, 45
U.S.C.A. § 51-60 (railroad employees in interstate commerce); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (seamen);
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-68 (applying to any person more than a maritime
league from shore)." Id.
61. KEETON ET AL.. supra note 36, at 946.
62. See id. at 949.
63. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 3:4 at 3:14.
64. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 950 and nn.57-59.

65. See id. at 950.
66. Id. at 946-47.
67. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 11:8 at 22-23.
68. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:9 at 1-36.
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Wrongful Death in Wyoming
Wyoming's wrongful death statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action to recover damages if death had not ensued, the person
who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable to an
action for damages, even though the death was caused under circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree, or manslaughter. If the person so liable dies, the action may
be brought against the executor or administrator of his estate. If he
left no estate within the State of Wyoming, the court may appoint
an administrator upon application6'
In addition, an accompanying provision includes the following limitation period, "[e]very such action shall be commenced within two (2) years
after the death of the deceased person."'" The language in the current statutes differs only slightly from that in Wyoming's original wrongful death
statute, enacted in 1871.7,
In Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, the Wyoming Supreme Court construed the statute for the first time, rejecting the argument that survivors
could not recover for wrongful death when the decedent never had a cause
of action of his own because he was killed instantly." The Wyoming Supreme Court held that a new cause of action for wrongful death accrues in
survivors of a person killed, regardless of whether the death was instantaneous. 7 1 The action, the court ruled, "is not one transferred from the decedent
to the administrator but is one given directly to the administrator for the
benefit of certain living relatives."' In analyzing whether the statute reflected the "loss to survivor" or "loss to estate" approach,7' the court compared the Wyoming statute to others "similar" to Lord Campbell's Act. '6
The result was a holding that the statute is a "pure" wrongful death statute
under which damages are measured by the loss to survivors, not the loss to
the decedent's estate.-

69. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-101 (Lexis 1999).
70. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-102 (d) (Lexis 1999).
71. The Wyoming Legislature amended the wrongful death statute in 1920 to eliminate a cap on
recovery. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 3 P.2d 105, 106 (Wyo. 1931). That change and other amendments to the statute that followed have not significantly altered the provisions of the statute that are
discussed in this note.
72. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 3 P.2d 105, 107 (Wyo. 1931).
73. Id. at 107.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
76. Coliseum Motor Co., 3 P.2d at 108.
77 Id
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In Parsonsv. Roussalis, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to allow
recovery by survivors under both Wyoming's wrongful death statute and its
survival statute." Though the court acknowledged that a cause of action for
the underlying personal injuries sometimes survives via the survival statute,
it held that recovery when death occurs is limited to the damages stemming
from the wrongful death."' In doing so, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected an argument that the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering plays a
part in establishing damages for wrongful death.1
Eight years later in DeHerrera v. Herrera, the Wyoming Supreme
Court again examined the relationship between the survival and wrongful
death statutes." After determining that Wyoming's survival statute is ambiguous, the court differentiated between the two statutes by holding that
estate
damages under the survival statute become part of the decedent's
2
while those recovered under the wrongful death statute do not.
In Corkill v. Knowles, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the
limitation period in the wrongful death statute is an "integral part of the
right created by the statute" and is a condition precedent to recovery rather
than a true statute of limitations." The court also held that the identification
of the decedent is another condition precedent in the wrongful death
statute." In doing so, the Wyoming Supreme Court allowed a personal representative to bring suit for wrongful death more than fifteen years after the
decedent died but less than two years after her body was identified." The
court reasoned that a contrary result could lead to the absurdity of the limitation period expiring on a wrongful death cause of action before a decedent
is even identified. The court noted that such a rule would "thwart the legislative purpose of the wrongful death statute."" The Wyoming Supreme
Court also held that the discovery rule' does not apply to the wrongful
78. 488 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1971). Wyoming's survival statute provides in pertinent part, "An

action may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same, but in
actions for personal injury damages, if the person entitled thereto dies recovery is limited to damages for
wrongful death." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-101 (Lexis 1999).
79. Parsons,488 P.2d at 1052.
80. Id.

81. 565 P.2d 479 (Wyo. 1977).
82. Id. at 482.
83. 955 P.2d 438,442 (Wyo. 1998).

84. Id. at 445.
85. In this case, Corkill killed the decedent with her vehicle in 1980, but authorities were unable to
identify the victim. Id. at 440. After conducting further investigation, authorities finally identified the
body as that of Knowles, but not until more than 14 years after her death. Id. Sixteen months later, the
decedent's father, as personal representative, filed suit for wrongful death. Id.

86. Id. at 445.
87. The discovery rule, which Wyoming applies to tort claims, starts the statute of limitations ticking

once the plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the existence" of a cause of action. Id. at 440 n.I
(citing Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 336 (Wyo. 1979)). The district court in Corkill had applied the
discovery rule to hold that the wrongful death suit was not time-barred. Id. at 440. The court reasoned

that because identification of the decedent did not occur until more than fourteen years after her death,
the plaintiff "did not know or have reason to know he had a claim" until that time. Id.
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death cause of action because the limitation provision in the wrongful death
statute "clearly and unambiguously" requires the personal representative to
bring suit within two years from the time of the death of the decedent.8 '
PRINCIPAL CASE
In Edwards, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that an injured person

must have a viable claim at the time he dies for his survivors to have a cause
of action for wrongful death.19 The court first discussed the viability of any
medical malpractice claims Mr. Edwards had against Fogarty at the time of
his death.9 The court concluded, on the basis of evidence both from the
record and as presented by Fogarty, that Mr. Edwards was aware of the
misdiagnosis of his condition some time between February 21, 1991 and
March 21, 1991.11 As a result, the court held the statute of limitations for
filing a medical malpractice claim expired by the time Mr. Edwards died; in
other words, at the time of his death Mr. Edwards did not have a "viable
claim" against Fogarty.'9
The Wyoming Supreme Court next turned to what it termed the "only
true issue" in the case, namely, whether a wrongful death action is barred
because the statute of limitations has expired on the deceased's underlying

medical malpractice action. 3 Because the issue was one of first impression
in Wyoming, the court first looked to decisions in other jurisdictions for
guidance.94 Citing decisions from Michigan and Wisconsin and an annotation from the American Law Reports, the court concluded that the "clear

majority rule is that survivors are precluded from bringing a wrongful death

88. Id. at 443. Note that in rare cases like Corkill, the limitation period does not begin until identification of the decedent, and therefore suit may occur more than two years after death.
89. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 883 (Wyo. 1998).
90. Id. at 881.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Court noted that whether the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim by Mr.
Edwards was calculated according to WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-3-107 (a) (i), 1-3-107 (a) (iv), or the "continuous treatment rule" from Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1988), the period during which Mr.
Edwards could have filed suit expired before he died. Id. See supra note 19 for the language of WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-3-107 (a) (i). WYo. STAT. ANN. 1-3-107 (a) (iv) (Michie 1997) read: "If under paragraph (i) or (ii) of this subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is discovered during the second year
of the two (2) year period from the date of the act, error or omission, the period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended by six months." Originally, the "continuous treatment rule" referred to the rule
that "the act, error or omission which starts the running of the statute of limitations against medical
malpractice actions is the termination of the course of treatment for the same or related illness or injuries." Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 669 (quoting Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 417 (Wyo. 1985)). Subsequent to Metzger, the Wyoming Supreme Court extended the reach of the rule by holding that "the
continuous treatment of the patient ceased when the treating practitioner referred the patient to another
practitioner and no longer assisted in the patient's treatment or associated with the doctors thereafter
treating the patient." Id. (citing Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1987)). In Sharsmith, the court
further defined the rule, holding that a doctor's course of treatment should be imputed to doctors whom
the original practitioner relied upon in the course of treating the patient, for the purposes of the statute of
limitations. Id. at 670.
93. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882.
94. Id.
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action where the deceased does not have a viable malpractice claim at the
time of his death."'"
The Wyoming Supreme Court used another Wisconsin case, Miller v.
Luther, to demonstrate the rationale behind that rule.9 The Wisconsin Court
of Appeals, in Miller, interpreted a wrongful death statute nearly identical to
Wyoming's statute. In doing so, the Wisconsin court held that the expiration of the statute of limitations on the decedent's underlying claim barred a
claim under the wrongful death statute.'7 The court noted that the Wisconsin court recognized that the wrongful death action is separate and distinct
from any right held by the deceased." However, the Wyoming Supreme
Court said the action still is subject to "the same infirmities and defenses as
would have existed in a suit by the deceased if he were still alive."" Based
on this interpretation, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded, a "viable
right of action in the deceased at the time of his death is a condition precedent to the existence of a right of action in the survivors."1 ®
The Wyoming Supreme Court then analyzed the plain language in
Wyoming's wrongful death statute, which reads in part:
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action to recover damages ifdeath had not ensued, the person
who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable in an
action for damages.'5 '
Emphasizing a plain reading of the italicized portion, the court held that the
language of the statute "clearly requires" that the deceased have a viable
claim at the time of death for survivors to have a valid claim for wrongful

95. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882 (citing Turner v. Mercy Hospitals & Health Services of Detroit, 533
N.W.2d 365, 367 (Mich. 1995); Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 532 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Wis. 1995); David P.
Chapus, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Statute of Limitations in Wrongful Death Action Based on
Medical Malpractice, 70 A.L.R. 4th 535 (1989)).
96. Id. at 882 (citing Miller v. Luther, 489 N.W.2d 651(Wis. 1992)). In Miller, Mr. and Mrs. Miller
filed a medical malpractice claim against the defendant, alleging that he negligently diagnosed and
negligently treated Mr. Miller's cancer. Miller, 489 N.W.2d at 652. Eight years later, Mr. Miller died,
prompting Mrs. Miller to also file a wrongful death action against the defendant. Id. Upon determining
court
that the applicable statute of limitations on that medical malpractice claim had expired, the trial
granted summary judgment for the defendant and dismissed the first suit. Id. Subsequently, the trial
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment of the wrongful death claim. Id. The defendant argued that the medical malpractice statute of limitations and the wrongful death entitlement statute
barred Mrs. Miller's wrongful death suit. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
holding that the wrongful death statute itself conditioned suit on the decedent having a cause of action at
the time of death, and that the wrongful death suit thus should have been dismissed Id. at 654.
97. Miller, 489 N.W.2d at 655.
98. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882 (citing Miller, 489 N.W.2d at 653).
99. Id.
100. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882 (citing Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Del. 1989)).
101. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-101 (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).
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death.'1 It also noted that the minority view would "render meaningless the
language" of the wrongful death statute. 0
Last, the Wyoming Supreme Court discussed how the absence of a requirement that the deceased have a viable claim at the time of death might
lead to wrongful death actions many years or decades after the alleged negligence that caused the death.-°' That result, the court noted, undermines the
very purpose of statutes of limitation.0 " The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded by holding that wrongful death actions in Wyoming are derivative of
the underlying cause of action and that actions brought by survivors when
the deceased did not have a viable claim at the time of death are barred.116
Justice Golden'sDissent
Noting that Ms. Edwards filed her action for wrongful death within the
two-year limitation period included as a part of Wyoming's wrongful death
statutes, the dissent examined the plain language of the wrongful death entitlement statute. 07 In doing so, Justice Golden opined that the language of
the statute does not require the deceased to have a viable claim at the time
of death but, instead, simply identifies the type of tortious conduct that entitles survivors to bring a claim for wrongful death:
The plain reading of that language of the statute is that statutory
beneficiaries (the survivors) under the wrongful death statute may
not recover in those types of cases where the deceased never had a
cause of action against the defendants or where there is a substantive defense which could be invoked.01
By ignoring this plain meaning, Justice Golden concluded, the majority
improperly inserted a condition precedent into Wyoming's wrongful death

102. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882.
103. Id.

104. Id. at 882-83 (citing Cf. Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 623 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1993)).
105. Id. at 883.
106. Id.
107. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 883 (Golden, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Lehman joined Justice Golden's

dissent. Id.
108. Id (Golden, J., dissenting). Justice Golden directed attention to Gramlich v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
640 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Id. In Gramlich, Mr. Gramlich filed a medical malpractice claim

against the defendant for negligent failure to diagnose and treat cancer at an early stage. Gramlich, 640
S.W 2d at 182. After his death an amended petition was filed which named Mrs. Gramlich as the plaintiff and included an additional count for wrongful death. Id. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the
wrongful death claim, holding that the statute of limitations for the medical malpractice claim had expired before the original suit and thus barred the wrongful death claim. Id. at 183. The Missouri Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the cause of action for wrongful death does not accrue until the decedent dies and that wrongful death has its own statute of limitations. Id. at 186.
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statute. Had the legislature intended for the statute to operate in that fashion, it could have expressed such intent in plain English.'"
The dissent distinguished the wrongful death claim as one "separate
and distinct" from the underlying negligence claim."' Justice Golden argued the wrongful death claim is one that results from a survivor's own
"injury" caused by the death of a loved one, not from the injury to the decedent himself.' He noted that the Wyoming Supreme Court itself, in DeHerrera v. Herrera, distinguished between the underlying claim and the
new cause of action that arises upon death."' An action for wrongful death
cannot arise until after someone has died, Justice Golden added."'
Justice Golden also determined that the recoverable damages available
in a wrongful death case further differentiate it from the underlying personal
injury. Citing Parsons,DeHerreraand the language of the wrongful death
statute itself, Justice Golden detailed how recovery in wrongful death is
limited to the damages that result from the wrongful death, "including damages for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort."", As
the Wyoming Supreme Court noted in both Parsons and DeHerrera,the
plaintiff in a wrongful death action cannot recover personal injury damages
for injuries suffered by the decedent."'
Justice Golden returned to the argument that the statute does not tie the
wrongful death claim to the personal injury claim and limitation period. He
argued that the court should "heed the legislature's directive" that "civil
actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues, but where a different limitation is prescribed by statute, that shall govern.""16 Thus, Justice Golden continued, the
statute of limitation in the wrongful death statute, which requires that a personal representative bring the action within two years after the decedent's
death, should govern cases like Edwards., 7 Justice Golden concluded his
dissent by arguing that the rule embraced by the majority would "nullify the
operation" of the wrongful death statute in some circumstances."' Citing
DeHerrera,he noted that it "is contrary to reason to ascribe to a statute a

109. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 883 (Golden, J.,
dissenting).
110. Id. (Golden, J.,
dissenting) (citing Gramlich, 640 S.W.2d at 186).
111. Id. (Golden, J.,
dissenting).
112. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting) (citing DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 482 (Wyo. 1977)).
113. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting) (citing Gramlich, 640 S.W.2d at 186).
114. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 883 (Golden, .. , dissenting) (citing Parsons v. Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050,
1052 (Wyo. 1971); DeHerrera, 565 P.2d at 482-83; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-102 (Michie 1997)).
115. Id. at 884 (Golden, J.,
dissenting) (citing Parsons, 488 P.2d at 1052 and DeHerrera, 565 P.2d at
482-83).
116. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting) (citing WYO STAT. ANN. § 1-3-102 (Michie 1997)).
117. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
I18. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting) (citing DeHerrera,565 P.2d at 482).
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meaning that will nullify its operation, if capable of any other interpretation," and that statutes should not be read to lead to ridiculous results.''
ANALYSIS

In Edwards, the Wyoming Supreme Court explored the difficult issues
that arise in construing the relationship between a decedent's underlying

cause of action and the cause of action for wrongful death that accrues once
he dies. In particular, the issue of whether a viable underlying claim is a
condition precedent to an action for wrongful death has resulted in two distinct schools of thought-one arguing that a viable underlying claim is a
condition precedent, the other arguing that it is not.' ° In Edwards, the court
subscribed to the school of thought that requires the existence of a viable

underlying claim. In doing so, the Wyoming Supreme Court ignored the
legislative intent behind the statute, the purposes behind the wrongful death

action, and important policy considerations guiding promulgation of limitation periods for wrongful death. The result is a rule that unjustly restricts
the ability of survivors to recover for wrongful death.
The majority in Edwards generally tracked the reasoning in other jurisdictions that have reached the same conclusion: 1) the language of the statute creates the condition precedent; 2) wrongful death claims are subject to

the same defenses that existed against the underlying claim; 3) holding otherwise would undermine the purpose behind the personal injury statute of
limitation by opening the door to wrongful death claims several years, or
possibly decades, after the original tortious conduct."' Each contention has

119. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting) (citing DeHerrera,565 P.2d at 482).
120. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 11:17 at 47-49.
121. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882. The majority also purported to follow what it called the "clear majority rule" in other jurisdictions, relying principally on decisions from Michigan and Wisconsin and an
annotation from the American Law Reports. Id. (citing Turner v. Mercy Hospitals & Health Services of
Detroit, 533 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Mich. 1995); Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 532 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Wis.
1995); David P. Chapus, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Statute of Limitations in Wrongful Death
Action Based on Medical Malpractice, 70 A.L.R. 4th 535 (1989)). Though a survey of wrongful death
statutes and the way they are construed in other states is beyond the scope of this note, two points illustrate why the majority's reliance on Chapus is misguided. First, Chapus does not examine whether a
viable underlying claim is a condition precedent to a wrongful death cause of action but, instead, examines whether the wrongful death or medical malpractice statute of limitation applies in wrongful death
claims based on medical malpractice. See Chapus, supra. Second, while Chapus cites several jurisdictions that have held that the condition precedent exists, he does so for the purpose of categorizing those
states as jurisdictions in which the relevant statute of limitation is the wrongful death one. See id. at-3436. Chapus makes no comparison of states holding that there is a condition precedent and states that do
not, probably because such a comparison is irrelevant to his analysis of which statute of limitation controls. Indeed, some well-respected scholars have announced that the "considerable majority of the
courts" hold that the condition precedent does not exist. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 957. See also
James v. Phoenix General Hosp. Inc., 744 P.2d 695, 701-03 & nn.10-13 (collecting and analyzing cases
requiring and not requiring a viable underlying claim). In light of the majority's erroneous reliance on
Chapus and authority concluding that the majority rule is that the condition precedent does not exist, the
court's contention in Edwards that it is following a "clear majority rule" is tenuous, at best.
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merit, but all ignore the very nature of and purpose behind wrongful death
statutes.
The Statutory Language is Unclear
Wyoming's 1997 wrongful death statute read, in part:
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect
or default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action to recover damages if death had not ensued, the person
who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable in an
action for damages .... 22
The "crux" of the issue in Edwards, according to the majority, was the italicized portion of this excerpt."' According to the Wyoming Supreme Court,
the plain language of the statute "clearly requires the deceased to have a
viable claim at the time of his death in order for his survivors to have a valid
wrongful death claim. '' As such, the majority held that a condition precedent exists.'25 According to the minority, however, the italicized language
simply identifies the "types of inequities" that entitle survivors to sue for
wrongful death.'
The minority would have held that the statute simply
means survivors "may not recover in those types of cases where the deceased never had a cause of action against the defendants
or where there is a
7
substantive defense which could be invoked.""1
1"1

What is most clear in Edwards is that the statutory language at issue is
not clear. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, when a statute is
"uncertain and susceptible to more than one meaning [it] must be considered ambiguous."'-8 Whether a statute is ambiguous is a question of law to
be determined by the court."' A statute is considered unambiguous only if
"its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its
meaning with consistency and predictability.'' In Edwards, the Wyoming
Supreme Court could not agree as to the meaning of the statute with consistency or predictability. Three justices interpreted the statute to include
the condition precedent, while two others interpreted it quite differently.
The fact that a court may rule that a statute is unambiguous because a majority of justices believe the meaning is clear ignores the very spirit of the
122. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-101 (Michie 1997) (emphasis added). The current version of the
statute embodies the same language. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-101 (Lexis 1999).
123. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882.

124. Id.
125. Id. at 883.
126. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
128. DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 481 (Wyo. 1977) (citing Natrona County v. Casper Air
Serv., 536 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1975)),
129. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991).
130. Id.
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rule for establishing ambiguity. On the basis of the varying interpretations
of the statutory language at issue in Edwards, the court should have realized
that the relevant portion of the wrongful death statute is ambiguous.
By ignoring this ambiguity, the majority failed to analyze the statutory
language "with a view to promoting the apparent object of the legislative
enactment," as it did just months earlier in Corkill v. Knowles."' In that
case, the Wyoming Supreme Court announced that the language in an ambiguous provision of the wrongful death statute should be construed in a
way that promotes the Legislature's remedial intent in promulgating the
statute.' Though the court's analysis in Corkill focused on a different provision in the wrongful death statute, its methodology still is relevant, particularly because the ambiguous language in Edwards also originates in the
wrongful death statute.
Applying the logic and methodology from Corkill to Edwards, one discovers that the Wyoming Legislature, in promulgating the wrongful death
statute, "expressed a social policy that favors compensation to ameliorate
the certain damage to relational interests resulting from the death of a family member."", The Act creates a "new cause of action" for the benefit of
those family members who have lost a loved one.?1' Clearly, the Legislature's intent was to apply broadly the remedial brush of the Act, not to place
burdensome limitations on recovery for wrongful death. The Wyoming
Supreme Court's decision in Corkill acknowledged such intent by rejecting
a strict construction of the statute in order to allow a wrongful death suit
more than fifteen years after the decedent's death."5 An approach similar to
the one used in Corkill should have led the Edwards court to hold that there
is no condition precedent requiring the decedent to have a viable underlying
claim at the time of death.
Substantive versus ProceduralDefenses to the UnderlyingClaim
Though the majority in Edwards acknowledged that wrongful death
claims are separate and distinct from underlying claims, the Wyoming Supreme Court largely ignored that notion in reaching its conclusion."' Pure
wrongful death acts, unlike the "enlarged survival-death" statutes that exist
in a few states, are separate and distinct from any underlying personal injury
claim. Pure wrongful death statutes aim to compensate the survivors for the

131. 955 P.2d 438, 442 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting United Air Lines v. State Tax Comm'n of Missouri,
377 S.W.2d 444,451 (Mo. banc 1964)).
132. Corkill, 955 P.2d at 442.
133. Id. (quoting Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1175

(Wyo. 1990)).
134. Id. (citing DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 482 (Wyo. 1977) and Coliseum Motor Co. v.
Hester, 3 P.2d 105,107 (Wyo. 1931)).
135. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
136. Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 882 (Wyo. 1998).
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injuries they suffer, not for the injuries to the decedent. Wyoming's statute
creates a new cause of action in the decedent's survivors, includes its own
limitation period, and indicates what damages may be awarded.'" Just as
the right to recover for his own personal injury existed solely in the decedent during his lifetime, the new cause of action for wrongful death exists
solely in the survivors after the decedent dies, and not until death occurs.'8
The majority in Edwards contended, as many other jurisdictions have,
that wrongful death actions are subject to the same "infirmities and defenses
as would have existed in a suit by the deceased if he were still alive."'", For
the most part, this is true for substantive defenses like assumption of risk,
consent, contributory negligence, defense of property, and self-defense.'
However, those defenses often bar subsequent wrongful death suits because
they go to the very essence of whether the death involved was legally
"wrongful." They help define whether the decedent ever had a cause of
action in the first place. If he did not, no cause of action for wrongful death
exists.
On the other hand, procedural defenses to the underlying claim, such as
statutes of limitation, do not define whether there was anything "wrongful"
about the injury that led to death. As a result, procedural defenses should
not bar subsequent actions for wrongful death. They are solely a matter
between the person who caused the original injury and the person who suffered it. Many death statutes, like the one in Wyoming, contain a separate
limitation period and do not tie that period to the statute that controls the
underlying claim. As a result, though substantive defenses to the underlying
claim normally bar a subsequent wrongful death claim, procedural ones
should not.
The Purposesof Statutes of Limitation
The majority in Edwards also noted that allowing a wrongful death
claim when the decedent did not have a viable underlying claim at the time
of his death undermines the purposes of the statute of limitation for medical
malpractice.14 Such a holding, according to the Wisconsin court, "would
open the door to actions accruing upon death, even if death occurred twenty
years after the causally negligent act.""' Proponents of this view argue that
such a result actually circumvents the statute of limitations that applied to
the underlying cause of action.'3' Statutes of limitation are an integral part

137. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-101 (Lexis 1999) and Wyo. STAT. ANN § 1-38-102 (Lexis 1999),

138. Causey v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 81 S.E. 917, 919 (N.C. 1914).
139. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882 (citing Miller v. Luther, 489 N.W.2d 651,653 (Wis. 1992)).
140. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 954-55 & nn.9-14.
141. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 882.

142. Id. at 882-83 (citing Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 623 N.E.2d 946 (111.
1993)).
143. Miller, 489 N.W.2d at 655.
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of our judicial system and are grounded in policy considerations including
affording defendants the chance to defend themselves, protecting defendants
from the prolonged fear of litigation, and preventing stale claims.'"
These considerations make for a plausible argument that an underlying
claim should be viable at the time of the decedent's death. One easily can
envision a scenario where an individual is injured but lives for five or ten
years before dying-a medical misdiagnosis is a perfect example. If no
viable underlying claim is required to bring suit for wrongful death, the
negligent doctor is left wondering whether the patient's family will bring
suit, possibly decades after his original misdiagnosis. If they eventually
sue, evidence may be lost or altered, memories will have faded, and the
witnesses, including the original victim, will have died or disappeared.
However, another critical purpose behind limitation periods is to ensure that plaintiffs have an ample opportunity to bring suit.'' Analysis of
that consideration and others leads to the conclusion that the two-year limitation period in the wrongful death statute should be the sole limitation period governing wrongful death suits. This contention is supported by the
fact that the Legislature promulgated a specific limitation period for wrongful death claims. Had the Legislature intended for a different limitation
period to govern or for the one in the wrongful death statute to operate in
conjunction with other statutes of limitation, it could have crafted the statute
to reflect that intention. Instead, in promulgating the general statutes of
limitation, the Legislature said, "civil actions can only be commenced
within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues, but where a different limitation period is prescribed by statute, that
shallgovern.'"'4

In creating a specific limitation period for wrongful death, the Legislature gives survivors ample opportunity to grieve, to adjust to the loss of a
loved one, and to consider whether to pursue a lawsuit. According to the
rule advanced by the majority, underlying statutes of limitation could bar a
death even occurs. Statutes should
wrongful death action, sometimes before
1
be read to avoid such absurd results.
Maybe even more compelling is the interest in protecting a dying individual from the undue burden of contemplating a tort action to maintain the
viability of a wrongful death action by his survivors. Here, the very situation that Larry Edwards and his family faced serves as a suitable example.
Once Larry Edwards discovered the misdiagnosis by Dr. Fogarty, the statute
144. Turner v. Mercy Hospitals & Health Services of Detroit, 533 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Mich. 1995).
145. Id.
146. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-102 (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added).
147. Edwards, 962 P.2d at 884 (Golden, J., dissenting) (citing DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479,
482 (Wyo. 1977)).
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of limitations on his cause of action for medical malpractice began to tick.
At the same time, Edwards underwent numerous surgical procedures in an
attempt to save his life. He also began the exhaustive and oftentimes debilitating process of radiation treatment. Just after the statute of limitations
expired on his medical malpractice claim, Edwards died.
The rule that the majority establishes would have required Edwards to
initiate a lawsuit while he was dying so that his family could recover for
wrongful death once he died. The notion that the Legislature intended to
add such a burden, or that adding such a burden is good social policy, seems
absurd.
CONCLUSION

The reality of the wrongful death action is that neither rule considered
by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Edwards is entirely satisfactory. Each
option results in hardship to a different segment of the population. However, the choice between imposing hardships on a culpable physician or on
an innocent patient and his grieving family is quite clear. The language in
Wyoming's wrongful death statute and the very nature of the action make
the choice even clearer. A viable underlying claim should not be necessary
to maintain a suit for wrongful death, so long as the underlying conduct was
wrongful. Fortunately, the type of situation that unfolded in Edwards is
relatively rare. However, it could happen again. The simplest solution for
avoiding such future injustices is for the Legislature to amend Wyoming's
wrongful death statute to indicate that it does not include the condition
precedent. In doing so, the Legislature can protect other families from the
obvious injustice that results from the rule announced in Edwards. Only
then will Wyoming have a wrongful death statute that truly compensates
survivors for the loss of a loved one.
ROBERT C. JAROSH
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